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EXEMPTION CLAUSES AND THE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 68 OF 2008: 
AN ASSESSMENT OF NAIDOO V BIRCHWOOD HOTEL 2012 6 SA 170 (GSJ) 
Y Mupangavanhu 
1  Introduction 
The purpose of this article is to analyse the decision in Naidoo v Birchwood Hotel 
against the background of the previous jurisprudence regarding exemption clauses,1 
including the position of exemption clauses in a new constitutional dispensation.2 In 
general, exemption clauses are binding and enforceable where the clause is clear 
and unambiguous,3 and the court must give effect to the exemption clause even if 
its consequences are harsh.4 In principle, public policy requires courts to give effect 
to the intention of the parties by enforcing the clause. Exemption clauses are, 
however, unenforceable if the clause is against public policy or if it is unusual in such 
an agreement. 
When a dispute arises regarding the enforcement of a contract, the caveat 
subscriptor rule is applied first and a party is thus bound by the terms of the 
agreement by virtue of his signature.5 Where the exemption clause is unusual or 
unexpected and the attention of the other party was not drawn to the clause, the 
iustus error doctrine has been relied upon by litigants in order to escape liability.6 
This doctrine is invoked in cases where the contract assertor had a legal duty to 
                                        
  Yeukai Mupangavanhu. LLB (UFH) LLM LLD (UWC) Lecturer, University of the Western Cape. 
Email: ychandaengerwa@uwc.ac.za. 
1  Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom 2002 6 SA 21 (SCA); Johannesburg Country Club v Stott 2004 5 
SA 511 (SCA); Drifters Adventure Tours CC v Hircock 2007 2 SA 83 (SCA); George v Fairmead 
1958 2 SA 465 (A). 
2  See also Bhana and Pieters 2005 SALJ 876-889; Naude and Lubbe 2005 SALJ 458-459; Lubbe 
2004 SALJ 397-400; Stoop 2008 SA Merc LJ 502-503; Hopkins 2007 De Rebus 22-25; Marx and 
Govindjee 2007 Obiter 622-635. 
3  Christie and Bradfield Law of Contract 187; Bhana, Bonthys and Nortje Student's Guide 173. 
4  Hutchison and Pretorius Law of Contract 271. 
5  George v Fairmead 1958 2 SA 465 (A). See also Stoop 2008 SA Merc LJ 502-503; Kerr Law of 
Contract 102. 
6  Mercurius Motors v Lopez 2008 3 SA 572 (SCA); Brink v Humphries and Jewell (Pty) Ltd 2005 2 
SA 419 (SCA); Spindrifter (Pty) Ltd v Lester Donovan (Pty) Ltd 1986 1 SA 303 (A); Du Toit v 
Atkinson's Motors Bpk 1985 2 SA 893 (A); Pretorius 2010 THRHR 492. 
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inform the contract denier of the existence of an unusual or unexpected clause in a 
contract.7 
This article explores the extent to which a claimant can rely on a delictual claim to 
hold the other party liable for loss or injuries sustained, irrespective of the existence 
of a disclaimer or exemption clause absolving the other party from such liability. The 
reason for focusing on the decision in Naidoo is that it brings a new dimension to the 
problems regarding exemption clauses and disclaimer notices. The Court declined to 
uphold the exemption clauses or disclaimer notices in the case on the basis that it 
would have been unfair and unjust to do so. The article examines the decision in 
Naidoo in the light of the provisions of the Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008 
(CPA). 
The second part of the article provides a summary of the facts leading to the dispute 
between Naidoo and the Birchwood Hotel. The third part focuses on the decision 
itself. The fourth part of the article critically analyses the decision. This part begins 
with a background to the enforcement of exemption clauses and then discusses the 
principles of fairness, justice and reasonableness. It also examines the potential 
impact of the CPA provisions on exemption clauses. The fifth part deals with the 
implications of the decision in Naidoo, and the last part contains the conclusion. 
2  Facts 
On 15 October 2008, Naidoo, the plaintiff, wanted to exit the Birchwood Hotel 
premises but found that the gate to one of the entrances of the hotel was closed. He 
waited until a security guard came to open the gate. At that time Naidoo was inside 
his bus. After realising that the gate was still not open, Naidoo walked towards the 
gate. The gate had jammed and the wheels had come off the rails. The gate fell on 
Naidoo as he was approaching the entrance, causing serious bodily injuries.8 
                                        
7  This was accepted as good law in Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom 2002 6 SA 21 (SCA) para 41. 
The Court held that the exclusion clause was expected and therefore not surprising. See also 
Naude and Lubbe 2005 SALJ 454. 
8  Naidoo v Birchwood Hotel 2012 6 SA 170 (GSJ) paras 2, 10-14. 
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The issue to be determined by the Court was whether Birchwood Hotel, the 
defendant, was liable for the bodily injuries sustained by Naidoo.9 Naidoo pleaded 
that the hotel was negligent in that it failed to take adequate steps to prevent the 
incident from occurring by not properly maintaining the gate, by not ensuring that it 
was safe for public usage, and by failing to warn the public of the potential danger 
created by the state of repair of the gate.10 Naidoo's case was consequently founded 
on the premise that Birchwood Hotel had been negligent and that it could have 
prevented the harm from occurring. 
Birchwood Hotel relied on disclaimers and exemption clauses which were on the 
back of the hotel register. The question before the Court was whether such 
disclaimers were displayed at the time, and whether the disclaimer or exemption 
clauses exempted Birchwood Hotel from liability for any damages that Naidoo 
suffered. Clause 5 of the registration card stated: 
The guest hereby agrees on behalf of himself and the members of his party that it 
is a condition of his/their occupation of the Hotel that the Hotel shall not be 
responsible for any injury to, or death of any person or the loss or destruction of or 
damage to any property on the premises, whether arising from fire, theft or any 
cause, and by whomsoever caused or arising from the negligence (gross or 
otherwise) or wrongful acts of any person in the employment of the Hotel.11 
Naidoo did not refute the fact that he had not read the "Terms and Conditions" even 
after seeing the instruction: "Please read terms and conditions on reverse!"12 It was 
also not disputed that Naidoo was aware that standard contracts contained such 
clauses and that he was bound by the terms contained therein.13 
3  Decision 
In determining whether or not Birchwood Hotel was liable for damages, the Court 
referred to the test for negligence, that is, whether the conduct complained of fell 
short of the standard of care required of a reasonable person.14 Liability arises if the 
                                        
9  Naidoo v Birchwood Hotel 2012 6 SA 170 (GSJ) para 3. 
10  Naidoo v Birchwood Hotel 2012 6 SA 170 (GSJ) para 4. 
11  Naidoo v Birchwood Hotel 2012 6 SA 170 (GSJ) para 37. 
12  Naidoo v Birchwood Hotel 2012 6 SA 170 (GSJ) para 36. 
13  Naidoo v Birchwood Hotel 2012 6 SA 170 (GSJ) para 38. 
14  Naidoo v Birchwood Hotel 2012 6 SA 170 (GSJ) para 27. 
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diligens paterfamilias in the position of Birchwood Hotel would foresee the 
reasonable possibility of its conduct injuring another person and would take steps to 
guard against such occurrence, and whether Birchwood Hotel failed to take such 
steps. The test for negligence was articulated in Kruger v Coetzee, where the Court 
stated that liability arises where a reasonable person in the shoes of the defendant 
could have foreseen the possibility of his conduct injuring another person and would 
have taken steps to guard against such an occurrence.15 The Court found that the 
security guard had failed to take reasonable steps to prevent the accident by 
warning Naidoo to keep at a distance. The Court held that reasonable steps on the 
part of Birchwood Hotel would entail regular checks to ensure that every gate was 
well maintained and functioning properly at all times. If the gate was not functioning 
well, Birchwood Hotel should have warned the public of the potential danger posed 
by the gate.16 
It was contended that replacing the heavy gate with a new lighter gate was a 
precautionary measure which Birchwood Hotel took. The act of replacing the old 
gate indicated that reasonable steps could have been taken earlier to prevent the 
harm.17 It was further held that Naidoo had discharged his onus of proving that the 
standard of care of Birchwood Hotel fell short of that required of a reasonable 
person. The Court also found that Naidoo had played no part in causing the harm 
and that there was no contributory negligence. Birchwood Hotel was therefore one 
hundred percent liable for the damages.18 
 
The Court also had to determine if the exemption clause was binding on Naidoo and 
if it was not against public policy.19 Public policy imports notions of fairness, justice 
and reasonableness, and would prevent enforcement of a term which would 
potentially result in injustice. The Court applied the second stage of the Barkhuizen 
                                        
15  Kruger v Coetzee 1966 2 SA 428 (A). 
16  Naidoo v Birchwood Hotel 2012 6 SA 170 (GSJ) para 25. 
17  Naidoo v Birchwood Hotel 2012 6 SA 170 (GSJ) para 26. 
18  Naidoo v Birchwood Hotel 2012 6 SA 170 (GSJ) para 26. 
19  Naidoo v Birchwood Hotel 2012 6 SA 170 (GSJ) paras 40-48. 
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test.20 The question was if enforcing a contractual term that limits a person's right to 
a judicial remedy would result in an injustice?21 The Court found that the 
enforcement of the exemption clause would have been unfair and unjust. It was 
held that Naidoo had discharged his onus of proving his delictual claim and that 
neither the disclaimer notices nor the exemption clauses would have been a good 
defence.22 
4 Analysis of the decision 
4.1  Background to the enforcement of exemption clauses 
Turning to exemption clauses, it is necessary to examine first why exemption clauses 
are problematic and what their legal position is. Exemption clauses are viewed as 
problematic as they have the effect of excluding or limiting liability on the part of 
one of the contracting parties.23 Exemption clauses are as a result equated to clauses 
that deprive another party of legal redress.24 Such clauses may also negate the 
purpose of the contract in that they could affect the essence of the agreement.25 
Exemption clauses could also lead to exploitation of the party who is in a lesser 
bargaining position.26 The reason for this is that exemption clauses may be unfair 
and draconian; and their presence is generally abused, at least from a consumer's 
perspective.27In some instances the enforcement of exemption clauses appears to 
                                        
20  Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) para 59: "The inquiry is whether in all the 
circumstances of the particular case, in particular, having regard to the reason for non-
compliance with the clause, it would be contrary to public policy to enforce the clause. This 
would require the party seeking to avoid the enforcement of the clause to demonstrate why its 
enforcement would be unfair and unreasonable in the given circumstances." See also Sutherland 
2009 Stellenbosch LR 55. 
21  Naidoo v Birchwood Hotel 2012 6 SA 170 (GSJ) para 53. 
22  Naidoo v Birchwood Hotel 2012 6 SA 170 (GSJ) para 54. 
23  Van der Merwe et al Contract 258; Hutchison and Pretorius Law of Contract 252. 
24  See Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC); Bafana Finance Mabopane v Makwakwa 2006 4 SA 
581 (SCA). 
25  In Mercurius Motors v Lopez 2008 3 SA 572 (SCA) para 33, the court held that an exemption 
clause that undermines the essence of a contract and a hidden clause should be clearly and 
pertinently brought to the attention of a client who signs a standard instruction form and not by 
way of an inconspicuous and barely legible clause that refers to the conditions on the reverse 
side of the page in question. 
26  Bhana, Bonthys and Nortje Student's Guide 173; Van der Merwe et al Contract 258. 
27  Pretorious 2010 THRHR 499. 
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produce unfair and disastrous results.28 Unequal bargaining power alone is, however, 
not a sufficient ground or justification for courts to refuse to enforce such a clause.29 
Exemption clauses can be valid and enforceable if the words are clear and 
unambiguous.30 There seems to be no law that precludes an exemption clause from 
excluding liability arising as a result of a fundamental breach of a contract.31 It 
should be noted, however, that an exemption clause, just like any other contractual 
terms, may not be enforced in the following few instances: if it is against public 
policy or where it is unusual or where the clause was not set out in a conspicuous 
manner and form that was likely to attract the attention of an ordinarily alert 
consumer.32 
Although the courts seem to adopt a cautious approach regarding the enforcement 
of exemption clauses they will not easily set aside a contract where both parties 
signed the agreement. Innes CJ said in Wells v SA Alumenite CO: "No doubt the 
condition is hard and onerous; but if people sign such conditions they must, in the 
absence of fraud, be held to them. Public policy so demands."33 The position 
regarding some exemption clauses may change in the light of the provisions of the 
CPA, which will be analysed below. 
It should be noted that courts interpret exemption clauses restrictively with a view to 
mitigating the effects thereof.34 Lewis JA's dictum in Van der Westhuizen v Arnold35 
stated that courts must consider with great care the meaning of an exemption 
clause, especially if it is very general in its application. The reason for this is that an 
                                        
28  See Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom 2002 6 SA 21 (SCA); Durban's Water Wonderland (Pty) Ltd 
v Botha 1999 1 SA 982 (SCA) 989G-J. 
29  Du Bois South African Law 811; Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom 2002 6 SA 21 (SCA). 
30  Hutchison and Pretorius Law of Contract 271. See also Marx and Govindjee 2007 Obiter 629, 
631; Pike 2009 Legal Update 28; Stoop 2008 SA Merc LJ 508-509; Brand and Brodie "Good Faith 
in Contract Law" 108. 
31  Christie and Bradfield Law of Contract 193-194; Du Bois South African Law 811. 
32  S 49 of the Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008 (CPA). See also Johannesburg Country Club v 
Stott 2004 5 SA 511 (SCA). 
33  Wells v SA Alumenite CO 1927 AD 73. 
34  Christie and Bradfield Law of Contract 195. See also Johannesburg Country Club v Stott 2004 5 
SA 511 (SCA); Drifters Adventure Tours CC v Hircock 2007 2 SA 83 (SCA); Walker v Redhouse 
2007 3 SA 574 (SCA) para 13; Stoop 2008 SA Merc LJ 506. 
35  Van Der Westhuizen v Arnold 2002 4 All SA 331 (SCA). 
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exemption clause limits or ousts common law rights.36 The clause is thus interpreted 
as narrowly as possible. Restrictive interpretation is generally applied to clauses that 
are wide and do not only exclude specific grounds of liability.37 The rationale hereof 
is to protect a party against more extensive potential liability by confining the clause 
within reasonable bounds. 
If the wording of the clause is ambiguous, the court will interpret it against the party 
who is favoured by the clause.38 Section 4(4)(a) of the CPA also gives statutory 
authority to the contra proferentem rule of interpretation. Any contract must thus be 
interpreted to the benefit of the consumer.39 In Durban's Water Wonderland (Pty) 
Ltd v Botha40 Scott JA also pointed out that: 
If the language of the disclaimer or exemption clause is clear such that it exempts 
the proferens from liability in express and unambiguous terms, effect must be given 
to that meaning. If there is ambiguity the language must be construed against the 
proferens…41 
In other words the approach is that if the language is such that it exempts the 
proferens from liability in express and unambiguous terms, effect must be given to 
that meaning. If there is ambiguity, the language must be construed against the 
                                        
36  Van Der Westhuizen v Arnold 2002 4 All SA 331 (SCA) para 21. 
37  Van der Merwe et al Contract 259-260. 
38  Christie and Bradfield Law of Contract 196. 
39  Naude 2009 SALJ 506. 
40  Durban's Water Wonderland (Pty) Ltd v Botha 1999 1 SA 982 (SCA). 
41  The facts in Durban's Water Wonderland (Pty) Ltd v Botha 1999 1 SA 982 (SCA) were that the 
first respondent and her daughter were flung from a jet ride in an amusement park. Subsequent 
investigation revealed that there had been a failure in the hydraulic system governing the 
vertical movement of the car in which they had been seated. The first and second respondent 
alleged negligence on the part of the appellant. The appellant, on the other hand, relied on 
disclaimer notices which were on the ticket windows. The questions before the Court were the 
following. First, whether a disclaimer contained in a notice painted on the windows of the ticket 
offices in the amusement park had been incorporated into the contract governing the use of the 
park's amenities. Second, whether on a proper construction of the notice the appellant was 
exempted from liability for negligence. Third, whether the appellant, as operator of the 
amusement park, had been negligent. The Court held that any reasonable person approaching 
the office in order to purchase a ticket could hardly have failed to observe the notices with their 
bold white-painted border on either side of the cashier's window. The existence of the notices 
containing the terms was not unusual for a reasonable patron. It was further held that the 
appellant had done whatever was necessary to bring the attention of the respondent to the 
notices and that the contract was concluded subject to the terms in the notices. Similarly, the 
respondents had framed their pleadings based on a delict. Although the respondents had 
attempted to sue based on delict, their claim failed on the basis that the notices were 
conspicuous. The appeal thus succeeded. 
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proferens.42 The alternative meaning upon which reliance is placed to demonstrate 
the ambiguity must be one to which the language is fairly susceptible; it must not be 
fanciful or remote.43 It is clear from the above approach that the ambiguity may be 
used to reduce the effect of an exemption clause on the contract denier in terms of 
the damages suffered. Courts therefore accept an interpretation unfavourable to the 
proferens because he had the opportunity to express himself more clearly.44 The 
wording in an exemption clause, however, should be read with all the other terms of 
the contract.45 The facts in Naidoo did not give rise to interpretation issues. 
The question of whether or not an exemption clause in which liability for negligently 
causing bodily injuries and death is excluded will be constitutional was left open in 
Naidoo.46 In Johannesburg Country Club v Stott47 the Court similarly found it 
unnecessary to decide the question of whether or not an exemption from liability for 
negligently causing the death of another would be contrary to public policy In this 
case Mr Stott (the deceased) was struck by lightning while seeking shelter under a 
cover on a golf course. He was severely injured and subsequently passed away. Both 
the deceased and his wife were members of the Johannesburg Country Club. The 
Club's rules contained an exemption clause which included the following words: 
The Club shall in no circumstances whatsoever be liable for any loss of or damage 
to the property of any member or guests brought onto the premises of the Club 
whether occasioned by theft or otherwise, nor shall the Club be held responsible or 
in any way liable for personal injury or harm however caused to members or their 
children or their guests on the Club premises and/or grounds.48 
The approach to the interpretation of the above clause was a matter which the Court 
had to adjudicate. It had previously been stated that parties to a contract are taken 
to have intended their legal rights and obligations to be governed by the common 
law unless they have plainly and unambiguously indicated the contrary by including 
                                        
42  Hutchison and Pretorius Law of Contract 271; Christie and Bradfield Law of Contract 196; Naude 
2009 SALJ 506. 
43  Christie and Bradfield Law of Contract 196. 
44  Hutchison and Pretorius Law of Contract 271. 
45  Consideration of the ambit of the contract as a whole often allows one to reconcile provisions 
which, if read independently, would be irreconcilable. This also applies to exemption clauses. See 
Kerr Law of Contract 429. 
46  Naidoo v Birchwood Hotel 2012 6 SA 170 (GSJ) para 53. 
47  Johannesburg Country Club v Stott 2004 5 SA 511 (SCA). 
48  Johannesburg Country Club v Stott 2004 5 SA 511 (SCA) para 4. 
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an exemption clause.49 Where the exemption is clear and unambiguous, effect must 
be given to that meaning, as spelled out in Durban's Water Wonderland (Pty) Ltd v 
Botha.50 The Court nonetheless held that it would not be possible for the deceased to 
exempt the club from such liability, as one cannot forego the autonomous claims of 
dependents.51 
On the question of whether exemption clauses are compatible with constitutional 
values, and whether growth of the common law consistent with the spirit, purport 
and objects of the Bill of Rights requires its adaptation, the Court stated: 
It is arguable that to permit such exclusion would be against public policy 
because it runs counter to the high value the common law and, now, the 
Constitution place on the sanctity of life.52 
This court in Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom 2002 6 SA 21 (SCA) left scope for such 
a conclusion.53 
In view of the above statement, it can be argued that an exemption clause may be 
against public policy and thus inconsistent with the Constitution. As to whether or 
not the enforcement of such clauses is fair in every circumstance, that is another 
issue. Whilst it is essential to recognise the doctrine of the sanctity of a contract, 
such clauses are valid subject to reasonableness and fairness, as pointed out in 
Barkhuizen v Napier.54 In essence, some exemption clauses may not be 
constitutional on the basis that they are unfair and unjust.55 
  
                                        
49  See Marais JA's argument in First National Bank of SA Ltd v Rosenblum 2001 4 SA 189 (SCA) 
para 6. 
50  Durban's Water Wonderland (Pty) Ltd v Botha 1999 1 SA 989 (SCA). 
51  Johannesburg Country Club v Stott 2004 5 SA 511 (SCA) para 6. 
52  The judge referred to S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (CC); Mohamed v President of the 
Republic of South Africa 2001 3 SA 893 (CC); Ex parte Minister of Safety and Security: in re S v 
Walters 2002 4 SA 613 (CC). 
53  Johannesburg Country Club v Stott 2004 5 SA 511 (SCA) para 12. 
54  Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) para 70. 
55  It appears that exemption clauses need to be adequately tested against the Constitution on the 
basis of fairness and reasonableness. 
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4.2 Principles of justice, reasonableness and fairness 
Principles of justice, reasonableness and fairness constitute constitutional standards 
or values that must be taken into account when enforcing an agreement. These 
concepts, however, are elusive. The extent to which courts may set aside a contract 
based on these principles is not clear. Nicholls J refused to uphold the exemption 
clause in Naidoo on the basis that its enforcement would not be just and fair in the 
circumstances. The issue that arises is whether Nicholls J's reliance on these 
principles can find support. 
Reasonableness and fairness do not at the moment qualify as free-standing 
requirements of our law of contract.56 These principles are still regarded as abstract 
values and they do not amount to substantive rules that courts can "employ to 
intervene in contractual matters".57 These principles as a result cannot be acted upon 
by the courts directly. The rationale for this is based on the notion that if judges are 
allowed to refuse to enforce a contractual provision simply because it offends their 
personal sense of fairness and justice, it will result in legal and commercial 
uncertainty. Brand J strongly argues that endorsing the notion that judges may 
decide cases on the basis of what they regard as reasonable and fair will give rise to 
"intolerable legal uncertainty".58 This is because a sense of what is equitable and fair 
is so subjective that the outcome in any given case will consequently depend on the 
personal idiosyncrasies of the individual judge. A clause accordingly cannot be 
declared invalid merely because it offends the sense of the individual judge.59 If 
judges are allowed to decide cases on the basis of what they regard as reasonable 
and fair, the criterion will no longer be law but the judge.60 
Allowing the criterion to be judge-based would establish an untenable position in our 
legal system. This may have an impact on the rule of law. There is, therefore, a 
                                        
56  Potgieter v Potgieter 2012 1 SA 637 (SCA) para 32. 
57  Bredenkamp v Standard Bank of South Africa 2010 4 SA 468 (SCA) para 53; Brisley v Drotsky 
2002 4 SA 1 (SCA) paras 21-24; South African Forestry Co Ltd v York Timbers Ltd 2005 3 SA 323 
(SCA) para 27; Maphango v Aengus Lifestyle Properties 2011 5 SA 19 (SCA) paras 22-25. 
58  Potgieter v Potgieter 2012 1 SA 637 (SCA) para 34. 
59  Brand and Brodie "Good Faith in Contract Law" 115. 
60  Brisley v Drotsky 2002 4 SA 1 (SCA) para 24; Bredenkamp v Standard Bank of South Africa 2010 
4 SA 468 (SCA) para 38. 
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need to ensure that even though judges are influenced by personal factors when 
making decisions, the law should still be the guide. In the light of the preceding 
discussion, the decision to rely on the fact that enforcement of the exemption clause 
in the circumstances would be unjust and unfair, in the sense that the clause 
infringes Naidoo's right to have access to court, a fundamental right entrenched in 
the Constitution, may still be open to criticism. The approach that a Court will have 
to adopt in future is to invoke the provisions of the CPA instead of relying on the 
limitation of the right to have access to court.61 
Notwithstanding the above general criticisms regarding the principles of fairness and 
reasonableness, the question that still lingers is if the values that underlie our 
Constitution should not be taken as the benchmark to measure the validity of 
exemption clauses in contracts.62 It remains to be seen if the courts are willing to 
develop these values.63 Be that as it may, the CPA is important in that it prohibits 
terms that are unfair and unreasonable. The Court in Naidoo thus could have relied 
on section 48 of the CPA to support its decision.64 Section 48 as well other the 
relevant provisions of the CPA are examined below. 
4.3  The potential impact of the Consumer Protection Act on exemption 
clauses 
The CPA was enacted to protect vulnerable consumers even from exemption 
clauses.65 It became effective on 1 April 2011.66 The Court in Naidoo could not apply 
the CPA as it was not yet in effect, the accident having occurred on 15 October 
                                        
61  S 34 of the Constitution provides that: "Everyone has the right to have any dispute that can be 
resolved by application of law decided in a fair public hearing before a court or, where 
appropriate, another independent and impartial tribunal or forum." It would seem that invoking s 
34 would amount to over-reliance on the Constitution, especially with the enactment of the CPA. 
There is also the question of whether or not s 34 of the Constitution should always be relied 
upon as a basis for challenging exemption clauses for being unreasonable and thus against 
public policy: Marx and Govindjee 2007 Obiter 634. 
62  Lerm Critical Analysis of Exclusionary Clauses. 
63  S 39(2) of the Constitution states: "When interpreting any legislation, and when developing the 
common law or customary law, every court, tribunal or forum must promote the spirit, purport 
and objects of the Bill of Rights." 
64  It is important to note that the Act was enacted for the purpose of the legislative control of 
unfair terms such as exemption clauses. See Naude 2006 Stell LR 384. 
65  The Preamble of the CPA. Van Eeden Guide to the Consumer Protection Act 37. 
66  Hutchison and Pretorius Law of Contract 32. 
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2008. The CPA does not have retrospective effect. The parties could neither make 
reference to the provisions of the CPA nor rely on them. If the accident had occurred 
after 1 April 2011 and the CPA had been applied, the judge would not have 
necessarily come to a different conclusion. The courts will in future rely more on the 
provisions of the CPA to justify their decisions. The fact that Birchwood Hotel was 
relying on the existence of an exemption clause shows that the Court would have 
applied the relevant provisions of the CPA. The Court would thus have been required 
to look at whether or not the exemption clause contained plain and understandable 
language.67 The Court further would have been required to ascertain whether or not 
Naidoo understood the contents of the clause. 
Section 49 of the CPA provides that the consumer's attention must be drawn to 
clauses that limit the risk or that indemnify the supplier.68 The clause or notice must 
be drawn to the consumer's attention in a "conspicuous manner and form that is 
likely to attract the attention of an ordinarily alert consumer, having regard to the 
circumstances…" 69 Naude is of the opinion that it is unclear what format would be 
regarded as sufficiently conspicuous.70 The steps taken by the supplier or service 
provider to bring the notice or exemption clause to the attention of the consumer 
should be reasonable, implying that any reasonable person should be able to easily 
observe the notice or provision.71 A consumer making use of a service will be bound 
by the terms of the notice if he was in fact aware of it, or if it was so conspicuously 
displayed that it can be inferred that he must have been aware of it.72 Consequently, 
Birchwood Hotel could have been required to prove that the exemption clause had 
                                        
67  S 49(3) read with s 22 of the CPA. Also see Naude 2009 SALJ 508. 
68  S 49(1) of the CPA: "Any notice to consumers or provision of a consumer agreement that 
purports to- 
(a) limit in any way the risk or liability of the supplier or any other person; 
(b) constitute an assumption of risk or liability by the consumer; 
(c) impose an obligation on the consumer to indemnify the supplier or any other person for any 
cause; or 
(d) be an acknowledgement of any fact by the consumer, must be drawn to the attention of the 
consumer in a manner and form that satisfies the formal requirements of subsections (3) to (5) 
... " (my emphasis). 
69  S 49(4)(A) of the CPA. See also Van Eeden Guide to the Consumer Protection Act 178; Naude 
2009 SALJ 508. 
70  Naude 2009 SALJ 508. 
71  Durban's Water Wonderland (Pty) Ltd v Botha 1991 1 SA 982 (SCA) paras 18, 19; Mercurius 
Motors v Lopez 2008 3 SA 572 (SCA) para 33. 
72  Hutchison and Pretorius Law of Contract 240. 
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been set out in a conspicuous manner and form likely to attract the attention of its 
clients. The facts of the case, however, show that the Court accepted that Naidoo 
was indeed aware of the existence of the exemption clause.73 That is why the 
existence of the clause was not the problem, but the enforcement thereof. 
The CPA further provides that the certain notices or provisions must be drawn to the 
attention of the consumer in a manner and form that satisfies the requirements of 
section 49(3)-(5). These are notices or provisions that limit in any way the risk or 
liability of the supplier or any other person,74 or any provision that purports to 
constitute an assumption of risk or liability by the consumer,75 or any provision that 
purports to impose an obligation on the consumer to indemnify the supplier or any 
other person for any cause,76 or any clause that purports to be an acknowledgement 
of any fact by the consumer.77 
Section 58 must be read together with section 49 as it requires the supplier of 
certain intrinsically risky facilities or activities to alert the consumer to the fact, 
nature and potential effect of the risk in a manner that meets the standards set out 
in section 49.78 Van Eeden argues that the totality of the phrase "fact, nature and 
potential effect" clearly indicates that the supplier is required to ensure that the 
consumer has an adequate understanding and appreciation of the risk rather than a 
superficial awareness of the risk.79 Section 49(5) of the CPA provides that the 
consumer must be given an adequate opportunity "to receive and comprehend the 
provision or notice".80 The purpose is to allow the consumer to make an informed 
decision. This reinforces the principle that the consumer must read and understand 
                                        
73  Naidoo v Birchwood Hotel 2012 6 SA 170 (GSJ) paras 38, 42. 
74  S 49(1)(a) of the CPA. 
75  S 49(1)(b) of the CPA. 
76  S 49(1)(c ) of the CPA.  
77  S 49(1)(d). See also Van Eeden Guide to the Consumer Protection Act 178. 
78  S 58 of the CPA provides: "The supplier of any activity or facility that is subject to any- 
(a) risk of an unusual character or nature; 
(b) risk of which a consumer could not reasonably be expected to be aware, or which an ordinarily 
alert consumer could not reasonably be expected to contemplate, in the circumstances; or 
(c) risk that could result in serious injury or death must specifically draw the fact, nature and 
potential effect of that risk to the attention of consumers in a form and manner that meets the 
standards set out in section 49." 
79  Van Eeden Guide to the Consumer Protection Act 178. 
80  S 49(5) of the CPA. 
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exemption clauses since they are binding.81 The consumer must assent to such 
provision or notice by signing or initialling the contract.82 It has thus been argued 
that Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom could probably have had a different outcome as 
the CPA would have placed an obligation on the hospital to draw the fact, nature 
and effect of the exclusion clause to the attention of the respondent before 
concluding the agreement.83 
Whilst it is important to ensure that consumers make an "informed choice", once 
their attention is drawn to the clause they are bound by the terms of the agreement 
including the exemption clause. The CPA does not afford consumers much protection 
as service providers are still able to use exemption clauses, but they should alert the 
consumers to their existence in a prescribed manner and form.84 In the case of 
standard contracts where the consumer has to sign the contract on a "take-it-or-
leave-it" basis, the fact that the CPA requires the consumer to be aware of such 
clauses is of no help other than to exclude the liability of the service provider or 
supplier. It is submitted that Pretorius' argument is valid, that viewed from the 
perspective of contractual mistake, the CPA may in fact have a lesser impact on 
protecting consumers.85 
The implication of an "informed decision" is that the contract denier cannot rely on 
reasonable mistake. Courts have in some instances managed to refuse to enforce 
exemption clauses on the basis of the contract assertor's failure to draw the 
attention of the other party to the clause, which translates into a failure of 
reasonable reliance on the part of the contract assertor.86 A consumer may now thus 
not rely on the iustus error doctrine where he was aware of the existence of an 
exemption clause in the agreement. From the above discussion it is apparent that 
                                        
81  Webber Wentzel Dispute Resolution Department 2012 http://www.sabinetlaw.co.za/economic-
affairs/articles/consumer-protection-bill-and-informed-choice. 
82  The requirement that the existence of all exemption clauses should be drawn to the attention of 
the consumer may be a double-edged sword in that the assertor may rely on the fact that the 
denier assented to the provision and is therefore bound: Naude 2006 Stell LR 378. Also see 
Naude 2009 SALJ 510. 
83  Naude 2006 Stell LR 378; Naude 2009 SALJ 510. 
84  S 49 of the CPA. 
85  Pretorius 2010 THRHR 500. 
86  Du Toit v Atkinson's Motors Bpk, Mercurius Motors v Lopez 2008 3 SA 572 (SCA); Dlovo v Brain 
Porter Motors t/a Port Motors Newlands 1994 4 SA 518 (C). 
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what the CPA appears to give with one hand it takes away with the other. It is 
submitted that in the light of the weaknesses in section 49 and the argument by 
Pretorius, the application of section 49 to either the Afrox or the Naidoo case would 
have been unlikely to have resulted in different conclusions. Notwithstanding these 
weaknesses, it will be sought to demonstrate below that the CPA still remains an 
effective instrument which a Court can rely on in its decisions. 
Section 48(2) provides that unfair, unreasonable or unjust terms include those which 
are so adverse to the consumer as to be inequitable or where the term is excessively 
one-sided in favour of any person other than the consumer.87 To enforce the 
exemption clause in Naidoo would have been inequitable, because Naidoo had not 
necessarily involved himself in risky activities. Naidoo can be distinguished from 
Dutfield v Lilyfontein School,88 where the plaintiff was participating in an activity 
known as the Kempton Corporate Adventure Race when she fell from a zip-wire 
affixed to the top of a scaffold platform and sustained injuries. The plaintiff had 
signed an indemnity form. The issue before the Court was whether the defendants 
were indemnified from liability by virtue of her having signed the indemnity 
document, or whether the defendants were indemnified only in the event of its being 
found that stringent safety measures had in fact been put in place for the adventure 
race. The Court held that the defendants would be indemnified against any claims 
provided that stringent safety measures were in place. In the event that the 
defendants failed to ensure that such safety measures were in place, the indemnity 
would not be operative. It was held that the indemnity provided by the plaintiff was 
conditional upon its being established that the defendants had done all things 
reasonably necessary to ensure the safety of the participants. The Court found that 
the defendants had failed to do so. The case was thus decided in favour of the 
plaintiff. Taking part in an adventure race was a risky activity compared to the 
activity of Naidoo, who had booked a stay at a hotel. There was no obvious inherent 
risk in what Naidoo did. 
                                        
87  S 48(2)(a) and (b) of the CPA. 
88  Dutfield v Lilyfontein School 2011 ZAECGHC 3. 
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A hotel is a public place and it has to ensure that its customers are safe, in the same 
way as a hospital is reasonably expected to provide quality services by ensuring that 
patients are treated in a professional manner and in accordance with professional 
standards that do not cause harm.89 This view is based on the principle of reasonable 
expectations. The law should be more willing to protect the reasonable expectations 
of parties and should give them legal force.90 The principle is not foreign to the law 
of contract as the reasonable expectations of a negotiating party within the context 
of mistake are protected.91 A guest at a hotel does not expect any danger and will 
only assent to a risk which is reasonably foreseen. In a situation where a gate falls 
on a guest, resulting in serious injuries, the reasonable expectations principle could 
be used to justify the non-enforcement of an exemption clause. 
The question that springs to mind is: what happens in situations where the attention 
of the consumer was drawn to an unfair term before the conclusion of the contract? 
It is submitted that in instances where a term that is unfair, unreasonable or unjust 
was drawn to the consumer's attention in the prescribed manner and form, the court 
may refuse to enforce it on the basis that it is unfair.92 This is so because it is not 
sufficient for the attention of the consumer to be drawn to the unfair term in order 
to achieve an informed decision.93 The critical issue is whether or not the term 
qualifies as unfair and thus is prohibited in terms of the CPA. The fact that the term 
was drawn to the consumer's attention should not be allowed to prejudice him, as in 
most cases consumers are left with no option but to sign the document.94 
Section 48(1)(c) further reinforces the fact that any agreement is prohibited if it 
requires a consumer to waive any rights, assume any obligations or waive any 
liability of the supplier on terms that are unfair, unreasonable or unjust. Exemption 
clauses by their very nature constitute a waiver of rights on the part of the 
                                        
89  Letzler 2012 De Rebus 23-25. 
90  Brand and Brodie "Good Faith in Contract Law" 112. 
91  Van Huysteen, van der Merwe and Maxwell Contract Law 105; Hutchison and Pretorius Law of 
Contract 95; Van der Merwe et al Contract 34-36. 
92  Ss 48(2)(b) and 52(3) of the CPA. 
93  Naude 2006 Stell LR 378. 
94  The standard term creates an inherent structural inequality between businesses and consumers: 
Naude 2009 SALJ 529. See also Sharrock 2010 SA Merc LJ 296. 
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consumer. The exclusion of liability on the part of the supplier tends to be unfair or 
unreasonable as regards the consumer. It is highly likely that reliance on section 48 
could have enhanced the Judges' decision in Naidoo. Exemption clauses that fall into 
the section 48 category may be declared invalid on the basis that they are unjust 
and unreasonable.95 Section 51 of the CPA also prohibits terms that directly or 
indirectly waive or deprive a consumer of a right provided in terms of the Act. The 
prohibition includes some exemption clauses as they deprive consumers of their right 
to sue the other party for damages.96 Courts are given the power to declare 
agreements unconscionable or unfair in whole or in part in terms of section 52.97 
Accordingly, a court can strike down an exemption clause on the basis of unfairness. 
Regulation 44(3)(a) of the CPA "greylists" clauses excluding liability for bodily injury 
or death caused negligently. It provides that a term of a consumer agreement is 
"presumed" to be unfair if it has the purpose or effect of "excluding or limiting the 
liability of the supplier for death or personal injury caused to the consumer through 
an act or omission of that supplier…" The word "presumed" suggests that the 
unfairness may be rebutted. This explanation is consistent with "greylisting", which 
means that such a clause "must at the very least be included in an indicative list of 
clauses which may be regarded as unfair, whereas the supplier may still persuade a 
court otherwise".98 Whether a clause excluding the liability of the supplier for death 
or personal injury caused to the consumer is unfair or not depends on the 
circumstances of each case. In Naidoo the clause was regarded as unfair. 
The CPA also proscribes agreements, terms or conditions that exclude liability in 
cases of gross negligence.99 This is notable because the question of whether or not 
exemption clauses exclude liability even in a case of gross negligence was left open 
in Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom. The Court held that the question of whether or 
not the exclusion of a hospital's liability for damages caused by the gross negligence 
of its nursing staff was in conflict with the public interest was irrelevant to the 
                                        
95  Lerm Critical Analysis of Exclusionary Clauses. 
96  See s 51(1)(b)(ii) of the CPA. 
97  S 52(3)(a) of the CPA. 
98  Naude 2009 SALJ 511. 
99  S 51(1)(c)(i) of the CPA. 
Y MUPANGAVANHU  PER / PELJ 2014(17)3 
1184 
 
matter.100 The explicit prohibition of agreements, terms or conditions that exclude 
liability in cases of gross negligence implies that ordinary negligence is not covered. 
Thus, the CPA does not ban exemption clauses per se. However, exemption clauses 
which are unfair or unreasonable are invalid. Although the CPA explains the meaning 
of "unfair, unreasonable or unjust" in section 48(2), phrases such as "so adverse to 
the consumer as to be inequitable" are not defined. The exact meaning of 
"inequitable" is thus left to the determination of the court. It is argued that the 
above provisions must be interpreted in a purposive manner to ensure that 
consumers are adequately protected.101 It is further argued that section 51(1)(c) of 
the CPA should be amended to include a ban on exemption clauses that exclude 
liability for death or personal injury. The rationale for this is that an exclusion of 
liability for personal injuries or death is contrary to public policy.102 The unlimited 
enforcement of an exemption clause excluding liability for death or personal injury 
cannot be tolerated and should thus be set aside.103 It is undesirable to allow 
hospitals or hotels to become negligent. These are public places and they have a 
duty to provide a safe environment. It would have been unfair to uphold an 
exemption clause in the circumstances of Naidoo.  
                                        
100  Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom 2002 6 SA 21 (SCA) para 13. The facts of this case are that the 
respondent had been admitted to a private hospital owned by the appellant for an operation and 
post-operative medical treatment. The respondent had signed the admission document without 
reading it, and the document contained an exclusion of liability and an indemnity clause 
absolving the hospital and/or its employees or agents from all liability. The appellant sought to 
rely on this exemption clause and indemnity. The respondent did not dispute the fact that the 
receptionist had pointed out the space where he was supposed to sign but argued that he had 
not been directed to the exclusion of liability and indemnity. The respondent further argued that 
it was a tacit term of the agreement that the appellant's nursing staff would treat him in a 
professional manner and with reasonable care. After the operation, certain negligent conduct by 
a nurse led to complications resulting in the respondent suffering damages. The respondent 
argued that the conduct of the nurse constituted a breach of contract by the appellant and 
instituted an action against the appellant for the damages suffered. The Court held that the 
subjective expectations of the respondent were not relevant in determining if there was a legal 
duty on the appellant to alert respondent to the inclusion of the exclusion of liability and 
indemnity. The question was whether such clauses were unusual or not. The Court held that 
exclusions of liability and indemnities were the rule and not the exception in standard form 
contracts. It was accordingly found that there was no legal duty on the appellant to alert 
respondent to the terms of the contract and that the clause was not against public policy. There 
was also no evidence indicating that the respondent had indeed occupied a weaker bargaining 
position than the appellant during the conclusion of the contract. 
101  Christie and Bradfield Law of Contract 22. 
102  Brand and Brodie "Good Faith in Contract Law" 115. 
103  Brand and Brodie "Good Faith in Contract Law" 115. 
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4.4  Enforcement of exemption clauses 
The decision in Naidoo appears to indicate that there are better chances of holding 
the other party liable in delict for harm suffered when there is concurrent liability in 
contract and delict.104 Naidoo involved patrimonial loss which arose as a result of 
bodily harm.105 The same set of facts could in principle give rise to both delictual and 
contractual remedies.106 A claim in contract would arise based on the fact that the 
hotel owed its customers a duty of care to maintain its premises in a safe 
condition.107 Naidoo thus could have alleged a breach of contract following the harm 
that was suffered as a result of the malfunctioning of the gate. The validity of the 
contract would have been considered in the light of public policy.108 Considerations 
such as good faith and reasonableness would have been taken into account to 
determine the validity of the exemption clause. The plaintiff elected to sue in delict. 
It appears that the standard of proof can easily be discharged in proving negligence, 
as against suing in terms of the law of contract, where Naidoo would have been 
required to prove that the exemption clause was unreasonable and thus against 
public policy.109To avoid the problematic nature of exemption clauses and the onus 
of proof required in terms of the law of contract, it is argued that plaintiffs should 
rather frame their pleadings based on delict in cases where there has been bodily 
harm or death. If the plaintiff sues in delict the onus of proving that the clause is 
reasonable would be on the supplier.110 It is argued that an exemption clause does 
not result in one’s contracting out of delictual liability. This is so because the gate 
                                        
104  Stoop 2008 SA Merc LJ 497; Hutchison and Van Heerden 1997 Acta Juridica 98. 
105  Naidoo had a choice to sue based on an action in delict or in terms of a contract. This is because 
the concurrence of contractual and delictual actions allows the plaintiff to have a choice of 
action. See Loubser and Midgley Law of Delict 188; Hutchison and Pretorius Law of Contract 9. 
106  Christie and Bradfield Law of Contract 191. See Lillicrap, Wassenaar and Partners v Pilkington 
Brothers (SA) (Pty) Ltd 1985 1 SA 475 (A) where Grosskopf AJA questioned if the damages being 
claimed were recoverable in delict. It was ruled that the loss was not delictual in nature. In 
contrast, the loss in Naidoo satisfies the elements of a delict and would therefore give rise to 
delictual liability. 
107  Naidoo v Birchwood Hotel 2012 6 SA 170 (GSJ) para 5. 
108  Van der Merwe et al Contract 259. 
109  Public policy in the new constitutional dispensation is derived from the fundamental values of the 
Constitution. It is rooted in the Constitution. See Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) para 
28; Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security 2001 4 SA 983 (CC) paras 54-56; Bafana 
Finance Mabopane v Makwakwa 2006 4 SA 581 (SCA) para 11. 
110  Christie and Bradfield Law of Contract 191. 
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could have fallen on anyone walking past it, and therefore the existence of the 
contract between Naidoo and the Birchwood Hotel was incidental. 
5  Implications of the decision in Naidoo 
The decision is a step in the right direction. It seeks to ameliorate the harm caused 
by exemption clauses which could be viewed as "unfair". It prevents reliance on 
such clauses. It would have been unfair and unjust to uphold the exemption clause 
in Naidoo. If the CPA had been applicable at the time, the Court would have relied 
on section 22 and section 49, and more importantly on section 48 and section 51(1) 
of the Act. 
It is significant to note that for a long period, fairness and reasonableness have been 
taken into consideration when setting aside a contract, but usually only in extreme 
cases.111 Limiting issues of unfairness and unreasonableness to extreme cases of 
"unconscionability" seems to require change, as this is out of step with reality. There 
is no doubt that a clause in a contract that offends the values embodied in the 
Constitution may be struck down on the basis that it is against public policy. The 
majority of the Court in Sasfin v Beukes112 held that the provisions in the deed of 
cession were so unreasonable and unfair that their enforcement would be contrary 
to public policy. The rationale was that Beukes would have been virtually a slave, 
working for the benefit of Sasfin. The principle expounded in Sasfin could apply and 
could justify the Court's decision to set aside such a contract.113 It is noteworthy that 
the result of the decision in Sasfin was hardly controversial since the unfairness was 
manifest.114 
                                        
111  Sasfin (Pty) Ltd v Beukes 1989 1 SA 1 (A). 
112  Sasfin (Pty) Ltd v Beukes 1989 1 SA 1 (A). 
113  Smalberger JA stated in Sasfin (Pty) Ltd v Beukes 1989 1 SA 1 (A) para 12 that "the power to 
declare contracts against public policy should, however, be exercised sparingly and only in the 
clearest of cases, lest uncertainty as to the validity of contracts results from an arbitrary and 
indiscriminate use of the power…"  
114  Brand and Brodie "Good Faith in Contract Law" 97. 
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Generally courts appear to be wary when deciding whether or not to enforce 
contractual provisions on the basis that the agreement is unfair or unjust.115 It can 
be construed that it is this restraint on the part of courts that seems still to favour 
the freedom of contract and the pacta sunt servanda principle over other principles 
such as fairness and reasonableness.116 This seems to be the position despite the 
fact that in the new constitutional dispensation these principles must be applied in 
the light of the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights in accordance with 
section 39(2) of the Constitution.117 
Exemption clauses are a "rule rather than an exception" in standard contracts, but 
the other party often does not have "real" freedom in relation to the terms of the 
contract since most of the terms are not subject to negotiation except perhaps as 
regards price, payment terms, delivery date and warranties.118 The consumer is 
faced with a "take-it-or-leave-it" situation and is forced to accept the terms in a 
standard contract.119 There is thus no freedom of contract in reality. The freedom is 
rather theoretical or formalistic.120 Courts must take this factor into consideration 
where the defendant relies on disclaimer notices or exemption clauses to avoid 
liability. 
Naidoo marks a significant stride towards fairness and equity in contracts. Freedom 
of contract and pacta sunt servanda have usually prevailed over fairness. The 
importance of developing the law to ensure fairness has been long overdue.121 
                                        
115  Cameron JA in Brisley v Drotsky submitted that the Constitution did not give courts the power to 
invalidate contractual provisions because they happen not to coincide with the judges' own 
notions of fairness or good faith. See Brisley v Drotsky 2002 4 SA 1 (SCA) para 93. In cases of 
negligence, this submission may be fraught with difficulties as it would be unfair to exclude 
liability. 
116  See Hawthorne 2004 THRHR 294. Hopkins correctly points out that there appears to be an 
obvious and apparent unwillingness on the part of the SCA to free the law of contract from the 
shackles of the sanctity of contract rule, which have for so long held back the progressive 
development of our law of contract. See Hopkins 2007 De Rebus 23. 
117  Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security 2001 4 SA 983 (CC) para 43. 
118  Sharrock 2010 SA Merc LJ 296. 
119  Naude 2009 SALJ 529. 
120  See Stoop 2008 SA Merc LJ 496-497; Naude 2006 Stell LR 366; Bhana and Pieters 2005 SALJ 
885. 
121  As regards contract, the majority judgment of Ngcobo J in Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 
(CC) paras 48, 70 held that a term opposed to the values enshrined in the Constitution would be 
against public policy and therefore unenforceable. This leaves room for the doctrine of pacta 
sunt servanda to operate, but at the same time allows courts to decline to enforce contractual 
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Enforcing the exemption clause in Naidoo would accordingly not have been 
consistent with the spirit, purport and object of the Bill of Rights, as public policy is 
no longer rooted in the notion of contractual certainty.122 Public policy also demands 
some level of fairness in contracts.123 The law needs to embrace normative and 
constitutional values so as to adapt to the changing needs of the community, 
especially where there is a need to protect the weaker party to a contract.124 This 
argument was supported by Olivier JA in Brisley v Drotsky, where he stated that 
there is a need to strike a balance between the interests of legal continuity and 
social realities.125 
6  Conclusion 
The position established in South African contract law by Afrox Healthcare Bpk v 
Strydom regarding exemption clauses is untenable. There is a need to develop the 
law regarding exemption clauses beyond precedent.126 The decision in Naidoo is a 
milestone in the history of exemption clauses, representing a major step towards the 
realisation of fairness and reasonableness in contracts. If fairness and 
reasonableness will result in legal and commercial uncertainty, this will be a 
necessary price to pay in a legal system that values fairness as much as it does 
                                                                                                                          
terms that are in conflict with the constitutional values even though the parties may have 
assented to the inclusion of such clauses. What this means is that courts may decline to enforce 
a time limitation clause if its implementation would result in unfairness or would be unreasonable 
for being contrary to public policy. Time limitation clauses were held to be permissible subject to 
considerations of fairness and reasonableness. The same applies to exemption clauses: courts 
should not enforce such clauses if it would be unreasonable and unjust to do so. 
122  Hopkins 2007 De Rebus 22. 
123  Bhana and Pieters 2005 SALJ 868 correctly submit that a contract does not operate in isolation 
but in a social context. Society should thus exercise some control over a contract, so as to 
ensure that there is justice and equity. 
124  The fact that courts should be proactive in protecting parties who are in a comparatively weaker 
bargaining position was emphasised by Olivier JA in Brisley v Drotsky 2002 4 SA 1 (SCA). He 
further argued that the extent of legal and commercial uncertainty as a result of subjecting the 
shifren principle to the legal convictions of society was a necessary price to pay in a legal system 
that values fairness as much as it does certainty. 
125  Brisley v Drotsky 2002 4 SA 1 (SCA) paras 63, 69-70, 72, 75-76, 78. The law needs to take into 
consideration the high levels of illiteracy and poverty and the vulnerability of people in South 
Africa to justify why some agreements should be struck down on the basis of fairness and 
reasonableness. See Hawthorne 2004 THRHR 301. 
126  S 39(2) of the Constitution provides that when interpreting any legislation, and when developing 
the common law or customary law, every court, tribunal or forum must promote the spirit, 
purport and objects of the Bill of Rights. 
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certainty.127 Naidoo was a legitimate guest at the hotel, which was a public place, 
and the exclusion of liability for the injuries sustained as a result of negligence on 
the part of Birchwood Hotel would have been unfair. The enforcement of an 
exemption clause excluding liability for death or personal injury should not be 
tolerated and the clause must accordingly be set aside. 
Courts, however, must not completely ignore Brand JA's call in Potgieter v Potgieter 
for caution, namely that endorsing the notion that judges may decide cases on the 
basis of what they regard as reasonable and fair will give rise to "intolerable legal 
uncertainty".128 For this reason, inter alia, there is a need to strike a balance 
between certainty and fairness. Invoking sections 48 and 52(3) of the CPA in 
consumer-related disputes could help by ensuring that agreements that contain 
clauses which are unfair and unreasonable are not enforced. As a long-term goal, 
the CPA may have to be amended so that section 51(1)(c) can expressly prohibit 
exemption clauses that exclude liability for death or personal injury. Such an 
amendment will be consistent with the purpose of the CPA, which is to protect and 
advance the social and economic welfare of consumers in South Africa. 
  
                                        
127  See Olivier JA's argument in Brisley v Drotsky 2002 4 SA 1 (SCA). 
128  Potgieter v Potgieter 2012 1 SA 637 (SCA) para 34. 
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